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62 
The Supreme Court’s Quiet Expansion of 
Qualified Immunity 
Kit Kinports† 
The qualified immunity defense available to most executive 
branch officials in § 1983 cases is a creature of policy construct-
ed by the Supreme Court for the express purpose of “shield[ing] 
[government actors] from undue interference with their duties 
and from potentially disabling threats of liability.”1 In contrast 
to the absolute immunity accorded to legislators, judges, and 
prosecutors, the Court no longer engages in any pretense that 
its qualified immunity rulings are interpreting the congres-
sional intent underlying § 1983.2 
In its 1982 decision in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme 
Court openly refashioned the definition of qualified immunity 
in the interest of sparing public officials not only from liability, 
but also from the costs of litigation, “permit[ting] the resolution 
of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment.”3 Harlow 
eliminated the subjective prong of the Court’s prior two-part 
definition of qualified immunity and rewrote the objective 
prong to provide that executive-branch officials are safeguarded 
from liability so long as “their conduct does not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a rea-
sonable person would have known.”4 In the years since Harlow, 
 
†  Professor and Polisher Family Distinguished Faculty Scholar, Penn 
State Law. Copyright © 2016 by Kit Kinports. 
 1. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982).  
 2. Compare Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355–56 (1978) (reasoning, 
despite § 1983’s unqualified language, that Congress must have intended to 
incorporate common law immunities for judges), with Anderson v. Creighton, 
483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987) (acknowledging that the Court has “completely re-
formulated qualified immunity along principles not at all embodied in the 
common law”). 
 3. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685 
(2009) (“The basic thrust of the qualified-immunity doctrine is to free officials 
from the concerns of litigation, including ‘avoidance of disruptive discovery.’” 
(quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
the judgment))).  
 4. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (overruling Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 
322 (1975), which denied qualified immunity to government officials either if 
they “knew or reasonably should have known that the[ir] action . . . would vio-
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the Court has continued to refine the defense and expand the 
protection it affords government officials.5  
At the same time, the breadth of the defense has become 
apparent in the Supreme Court decisions applying the Harlow 
standard. During the past fifteen years, the Court has issued 
eighteen opinions addressing the question whether a particular 
constitutional right was clearly established. In sixteen of those 
eighteen cases, the Court found the governmental defendants 
were entitled to qualified immunity on the grounds that, 
whether or not they acted in contravention of the Constitution, 
they did not violate clearly established law.6 The Court has not 
ruled in favor of a § 1983 plaintiff on this question in more than 
a decade.7  
Interestingly, more than one-third of these sixteen defend-
ant-friendly rulings came in summary reversals, including at 
least one in each of the past four years. These cases represent 
about one of every seven opinions the Court issued without 
briefing and oral argument during that four-year period.8 Given 
 
late” the Constitution, or if they acted “with the malicious intention to cause a 
deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury”). 
 5. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 237 (2009) (justifying the deci-
sion to retreat from the requirement that courts ruling on qualified immunity 
motions first address the threshold issue whether the plaintiff alleged a con-
stitutional violation, in part on the grounds that the “two-step protocol ‘dis-
serve[d] the purpose of qualified immunity’” by “forc[ing] the parties to endure 
additional burdens of suit . . . when the suit otherwise could be disposed of 
more readily” (quoting Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 30, Pearson v. Callahan, 
555 U.S. 223 (2009) (No. 07-751), 2008 WL 3831556)); Anderson v. Creighton, 
483 U.S. 635, 639–41 (1987) (adopting a “particularized,” “fact-specific” ap-
proach to qualified immunity because a standard applied at a high “level of 
generality” would enable plaintiffs “to convert the rule of qualified immunity  
. . . into a rule of virtually unqualified liability simply by alleging violation of 
extremely abstract rights”). 
 6. See Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 312 (2015) (per curiam); Taylor 
v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2045 (2015) (per curiam); City and Cty. of S.F. v. 
Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1778 (2015); Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 352 
(2014) (per curiam); Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2383 (2014); Wood v. 
Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056, 2068–69 (2014); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 
2024 (2014); Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3, 7 (2013) (per curiam); Reichle v. 
Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2096–97 (2012); Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. 
Ct. 1235, 1250 (2012); Ryburn v. Huff, 132 S. Ct. 987, 992 (2012) (per curiam); 
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011); Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 
v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 378–79 (2009); Pearson, 555 U.S. at 243–44; 
Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004) (per curiam); Saucier v. Katz, 
533 U.S. 194, 209 (2001). 
 7. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 565 (2004); see also Hope v. Pelzer, 
536 U.S. 730, 745–46 (2002). 
 8. See KEDAR S. BHATIA, STAT PACK FOR OCTOBER TERM 2014, at 15 
(2015), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/final-stat-pack-for-october-term 
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that the only question discussed in these per curiam opinions 
was how Harlow’s clearly established law standard applied to a 
particular set of facts, these decisions arguably reflect the 
Court’s willingness to overcome its usual reluctance to assume 
an error-correcting role in a fact-bound case in the interest of 
protecting government officials from § 1983 litigation.9 Ironical-
ly, Justices Alito and Scalia leveled an objection along those 
lines in the one summary reversal that favored a § 1983 plain-
tiffwhich did not even go so far as to find that the defendant 
violated clearly established law, but merely that the lower 
court ignored “evidence that contradicted some of its key factu-
al conclusions” and thereby failed to view the record on sum-
mary judgment in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.10 
But my purpose here is not to criticize the Court for its se-
lective use of summary reversals or for decisions like Harlow 
that transparently alter precedent. Instead, my focus is on the 
Supreme Court’s qualified immunity opinions that have made a 
sub silentio assault on constitutional tort suits. In a number of 
recent rulings, the Court has engaged in a pattern of covertly 
broadening the defense, describing it in increasingly generous 
terms and inexplicably adding qualifiers to precedent that then 
take on a life of their own. This pattern began in 2011 with 
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd and continued with last Term’s decisions in 
City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan and Heien v. 
North Carolina. In making this claim, I explore three different 
issues: (1) how the Court characterizes the standard governing 
the qualified immunity defense; (2) whether lower court opin-
 
-2014/. 
 9. See SUP. CT. R. 10 (admonishing that “[a] petition for a writ of certio-
rari is rarely granted when the asserted error consists of erroneous factual 
findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law”); cf. Scott 
Michelman, Taylor v. Barkes: Summary Reversal Is Part of a Qualified Im-
munity Trend, SCOTUSBLOG (June 2, 2015, 11:17 AM), http://www.scotusblog 
.com/2015/06/taylor-v-barkes-summary-reversal-is-part-of-a-qualified 
-immunity-trend/ (suggesting as an alternative “horse-trading” explanation 
that these summary reversals represent “a kind of compromise position” that 
“satisfies Justices who want to protect the government officials before them 
and mollifies others who might fear a broader ruling that could harm civil 
rights plaintiffs across a range of cases”). 
 10. Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014) (per curiam); see id. at 
1868–69 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (complaining that “[t]here is no 
confusion in the courts of appeals about the standard to be applied in ruling on 
a summary judgment motion” and therefore “the granting of review in this 
case sets a precedent that, if followed in other cases, will very substantially 
alter the Court’s practice”). But cf. Ryburn, 132 S. Ct. at 991 (reasoning, in 
summarily reversing denial of qualified immunity, that the court of appeals’ 
decision “rested on an account of the facts that differed markedly from the 
District Court’s finding”). 
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ions can create clearly established law; and (3) how qualified 
immunity compares to Fourth Amendment principles. As de-
tailed below, in each of these areas the Court haswithout of-
fering any explanation, and without even acknowledging it is 
doing sobroadened the protection qualified immunity offers 
government officials in § 1983 litigation. 
I.  DEFINING THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY STANDARD   
The Harlow formulation of the qualified immunity defense 
set out above focused on what “a reasonable person” would 
have known about the constitutional status of the right assert-
ed by the plaintiff. The Court has adhered to that description of 
the standard in a long line of cases, noting in Anderson v. 
Creighton, for example, that the relevant question is whether 
the law is “sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would 
understand that what he is doing violates that right.”11 
In 2011, in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, Justice Scalia’s majority 
opinion quoted this portion of Anderson v. Creighton in intro-
ducing the Court’s discussion of qualified immunity and laying 
out the rules governing the defense. But Justice Scalia’s quota-
tion broke up the Anderson language, asserting that qualified 
immunity protects government officials unless the law is “‘suf-
ficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would have under-
stood that what he is doing violates that right.’”12 The Court did 
not explain, or even acknowledge, the substitution of “every” for 
“a,”13 but later opinions have picked up on al-Kidd’s modifica-
tion of Anderson.14 
 
 11. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987); see also, e.g., Moss, 
134 S. Ct. at 2067; Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1244; Pearson, 555 U.S. at 
231; Groh, 540 U.S. at 563; Hope, 536 U.S. at 739; Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 
208. 
 12. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640). But cf. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 
350 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (observing, in 
arguing in favor of granting qualified immunity, that “[u]nder the Harlow 
standard, we need not consider whether this information would be viewed by 
every reasonable officer as sufficient evidence of probable cause for the issu-
ance of a warrant”). 
 13. See Karen Blum, Erwin Chemerinsky & Martin A. Schwartz, Quali-
fied Immunity Developments: Not Much Hope Left for Plaintiffs, 29 TOURO L. 
REV. 633, 656 (2013) (hypothesizing that this alteration may have gone un-
challenged because “Justice Scalia did not call attention to the shift and the 
other Justices simply did not notice the change in the law”). 
 14. See Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam); Taylor 
v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015) (per curiam); Reichle v. Howards, 132 
S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012); cf. id. at 2095–96 (also using “a” reasonable official 
standard). 
66 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW HEADNOTES [Vol 100 
 
In the following sentence in al-Kidd, the majority went on 
to say, “[w]e do not require a case directly on point, but existing 
precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional 
question beyond debate.”15 The phrase “beyond debate,” which 
appeared for the first time in al-Kidd, has been used in eight of 
the eleven subsequent Supreme Court opinions that have con-
cluded government officials did not act in violation of clearly es-
tablished law.16 In support of this sentence, Justice Scalia cited 
Malley v. Briggs (presumably the Court’s observation there 
that, “[a]s the qualified immunity defense has evolved, it pro-
vides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or 
those who knowingly violate the law”)17 and Anderson v. 
Creighton (presumably language in that opinion requiring that 
“in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness [of the gov-
ernment official’s conduct] must be apparent”).18 
Malley’s reference to “plain[] incompeten[ce]” and “know-
ing[] violat[ions]” has been an increasingly popular refrain in 
the Supreme Court opinions concluding that government actors 
did not violate clearly established law.19 But this language ini-
tially appeared as dictum in Malleywithout supporting cita-
tionin a discussion explaining why police officers who execute 
a warrant not predicated on probable cause are afforded ade-
quate protection by the qualified immunity defense “[a]s [it] 
has evolved,” and therefore are not entitled to absolute immun-
ity. Thus, the Malley language, while colorful, did not appear in 
a context suggesting any intent to effect a substantive change 
in the qualified immunity standard.  
Similarly, the Court’s focus in Anderson was specifically 
directed at “the level of generality at which the relevant ‘legal 
rule’ is to be identified” and not the strength of the evidence 
 
 15. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2083. 
 16. See Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308, 309, 311, 312; Taylor, 135 S. Ct. at 
2044; City and Cty. of S.F. v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2015); Carroll v. 
Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 350, 352 (2014) (per curiam); Lane v. Franks, 134 S. 
Ct. 2369, 2383 (2014); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2023 (2014); Stan-
ton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3, 5, 7 (2013) (per curiam); Reichle, 132 S. Ct. at 2093. 
 17. See Malley, 475 U.S. at 341. 
 18. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). 
 19. See Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308, 310; Taylor, 135 S. Ct. at 2044; 
Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1774; Carroll, 135 S. Ct. at 350; Stanton, 134 S. Ct. at 
5–7; Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1244, 1249–50 (2012); al-
Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2085; Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 571 (2004) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 752, 758 (2002) (Thomas, J., dis-
senting); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001); Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 
224, 229 (1991).  
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needed to defeat a claim of qualified immunity.20 Moreover, alt-
hough the Anderson Court cited three cases in support of the 
notion that “unlawfulness must be apparent,” none of 
themsave perhaps for Malleysuggested any deviation from 
Harlow’s objective reasonableness standard.21 
Finally, other parts of the opinions in both Malley and An-
derson described the qualified immunity standard in the more 
prosaic tones used in Harlow, with the Malley Court noting, for 
example, that the relevant inquiry is “whether a reasonably 
well-trained officer in petitioner’s position would have known 
that his affidavit failed to establish probable cause and that he 
should not have applied for the warrant.”22 Harlow itself like-
wise identified the government actors qualified immunity was 
intended to protect in narrower and more neutral terms: those 
who “could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent 
legal developments, nor . . . to ‘know’ that the law forbade con-
duct not previously identified as unlawfu1.”23 
The Court’s tendency in recent cases to use a different ten-
or in describing the qualified immunity standardwithout ex-
planation or acknowledgementmay seem to be just a subtle 
shift in tone, but it signals a potentially significant alteration 
in the Justices’ views of the relative weight owed to the inter-
ests of plaintiffs and defendants in § 1983 litigation. In 
Mullenix v. Luna, the most recent decision in this line of cases, 
the Court’s entire description of the controlling standard reads 
as follows: 
The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials 
from civil liability so long as their conduct “does not vi-
olate clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known.” A clearly established right is one that is “suffi-
ciently clear that every reasonable official would have 
understood that what he is doing violates that right.” 
“We do not require a case directly on point, but existing 
 
 20. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639. 
 21. See id. at 640 (citing Malley, 475 U.S. at 344–45; Mitchell v. Forsyth, 
472 U.S. 511, 528 (1985); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 191, 195 (1984)). 
 22. Malley, 475 U.S. at 345. For comparable language in Anderson, see 
supra text accompanying note 11. 
 23. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Saucier, 533 
U.S. at 206 (noting that qualified immunity “operates . . . to protect officers 
from the sometimes ‘hazy border between excessive and acceptable force,’ and 
to ensure that before they are subjected to suit, officers are on notice their 
conduct is unlawful” (quoting Priester v. Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 926–27 
(11th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted))). 
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precedent must have placed the statutory or constitu-
tional question beyond debate.” “Put simply, qualified 
immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or 
those who knowingly violate the law.”24  
Noticeably absent from this summary of the law—which 
borrowed extensively from the modifications described above—
is any reference to the countervailing interests in vindicating 
constitutional rights and compensating victims of constitution-
al injury. The need to balance these competing goals in fashion-
ing the qualified immunity defense was recognized in Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, and at least received lip service in later Supreme 
Court opinions that ultimately sided with the defendant.25 Even 
if just a shift in tone, these generous characterizations of the 
qualified immunity defense can act to place a thumb on the 
scales favoring public officials in constitutional tort litigation 
and to justify dismissing an even greater majority of § 1983 
suits on qualified immunity grounds.26 
Perhaps of even greater practical import, however, is the 
Court’s recent suggestion that clearly established law can only 
be created by Supreme Court opinions. The Court’s quiet re-
treat from precedent on that issue is the subject of the following 
section. 
 
 24. Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted) (quoting, in order, Pearson v. Callahan, 555 
U.S. 223, 231 (2009); Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012); al-
Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2083; Malley, 475 U.S. at 341). 
 25. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 813–14; see also Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 
2056, 2067 (2014); Reichle, 132 S. Ct. at 2093; Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231. But cf. 
Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1774 n.3 (“Because of the importance of qualified im-
munity ‘to society as a whole,’ the Court often corrects lower courts when they 
wrongly subject individual officers to liability.” (citation omitted) (quoting 
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814)). 
 26. See Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment: An 
Empirical Analysis, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 667, 692 (2009) (finding, in a random 
sample of qualified immunity opinions issued by federal courts between 1988 
and 2006, that immunity was denied in only about twenty to thirty percent of 
the cases); Greg Sobolski & Matt Steinberg, Note, An Empirical Analysis of 
Section 1983 Qualified Immunity Actions and Implications of Pearson v. Cal-
lahan, 62 STAN. L. REV. 523, 545 (2010) (reporting that qualified immunity 
was denied in about one-third of a random sample of nine hundred § 1983 cas-
es decided by the federal appellate courts between 1976 and 2006). See gener-
ally John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. 
REV. 207, 269 (2013) (concluding that “[t]he barriers raised by qualified im-
munity, as currently administered, far exceed the rationales that support lim-
iting damages liability” and are “an inversion of sensible policy”). 
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II.  DETERMINING WHICH COURTS CAN CREATE 
CLEARLY ESTABLISHED LAW   
The Harlow Court did not attempt to apply its newly for-
mulated qualified immunity standard to the facts of that case, 
and expressly left open the question whether rights can be 
“clearly established” by lower court case law.27 In denying quali-
fied immunity to Alabama state prison officials in Hope v. 
Pelzer, however, the Court cited “binding Eleventh Circuit 
precedent” as well as a State Department of Corrections regu-
lation and a United States Department of Justice Report to 
support the conclusion that the officials acted in violation of 
clearly established law.28 Two years ago, in Lane v. Franks, the 
Court likewise observed that, had two earlier Eleventh Circuit 
precedents still been “controlling” in that jurisdiction, the 
Court “would agree [the defendant] . . . could not reasonably 
have believed that it was lawful to fire [the plaintiff] in retalia-
tion for his testimony.”29 Given a later circuit court opinion, 
however, the Supreme Court explained that, “[a]t best,” the 
plaintiff could “demonstrate only a discrepancy in Eleventh 
Circuit precedent, which is insufficient to defeat the defense of 
qualified immunity.”30 Moreover, in other cases concluding that 
government officials are entitled to qualified immunity, the 
Court has relied on binding state and federal precedent, finding 
it significant both that the defendants’ conduct was “lawful ac-
cording to courts in the jurisdiction where [they] acted”31 and 
 
 27. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 n.32. 
 28. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741–42 (2002); cf. Camreta v. Greene, 
131 S. Ct. 2020, 2033 n.7 (2011) (cautioning that “the considerations” leading 
the Court to grant a cert petition filed by government officials who were af-
forded qualified immunity and thus were the prevailing parties in the court of 
appeals might not “have the same force” for district court opinions because 
“district court decisions—unlike those from the courts of appeals—do not nec-
essarily settle constitutional standards or prevent repeated claims of qualified 
immunity”); United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 269 (1997) (refusing, in a 
case involving the reach of 18 U.S.C. § 242, the criminal counterpart to § 1983, 
to adopt “a categorical rule that decisions of the Courts of Appeals and other 
courts are inadequate as a matter of law” to provide fair warning to public of-
ficials). 
 29. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2382 (2014). 
 30. Id. at 2383. 
 31. Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3, 7 (2013) (per curiam); see also City and 
Cty. of S.F. v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1777 (2015) (concluding that “[n]o 
matter how carefully” the defendants “read [the relevant circuit court prece-
dents] beforehand,” they “could not know” they were “violat[ing] the Ninth 
Circuit’s test”); Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2382 (finding it significant that circuit 
“precedent did not provide clear notice” that the defendant was acting uncon-
stitutionally).  
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that the plaintiffs were unable to identify “any cases of control-
ling authority in their jurisdiction.”32 Thus, the Court has re-
peatedly looked beyond its own case law in assessing whether a 
constitutional right is clearly established.  
Beginning with Justice Thomas’ 2012 majority opinion in 
Reichle v. Howards, however, the Court began to equivocate on 
this issue, introducing its discussion of the Tenth Circuit’s prior 
case law with a caveat, “[a]ssuming arguendo that controlling 
Court of Appeals’ authority could be a dispositive source of 
clearly established law in the circumstances of this case.”33 The 
Court did not identify what “circumstances” in Reichle might 
have justified this reservation, nor did it provide any other ex-
planation for the statement and its deviation from past prac-
tice.34 But the Court has gone on to repeat the caveat on several 
occasions,35 most recently adding a potentially limiting qualifi-
er—“[a]ssuming for the sake of argument that a right can be 
‘clearly established’ by circuit precedent despite disagreement 
in the courts of appeals.”36 
The Court has also started to back pedal from earlier prec-
edent suggesting that “a consensus of cases of persuasive au-
thority” from lower courts outside the defendants’ jurisdiction 
can create clearly established law.37 Justice Scalia’s majority 
opinion in al-Kidd described “a robust ‘consensus of cases of 
persuasive authority’” as “what is necessary” to support a deni-
 
 32. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999). 
 33. Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2094 (2012). 
 34. See Karen M. Blum, Section 1983 Litigation: The Maze, the Mud, and 
the Madness, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 913, 955 n.283 (2015) (suggesting 
that the Court’s “tentativeness . . . made some sense in Reichle, where the de-
fendants were federal law enforcement agents who operate nationally,” but 
was “not so justified” in other cases). 
 35. See Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2045 (2015) (per curiam); 
Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1776; Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 350 (2014) (per 
curiam). 
 36. Taylor, 135 S. Ct. at 2045 (emphasis added). This Term’s decision in 
Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 310–12 (2015) (per curiam), mentioned at 
several points that none of the Court’s precedents supported a denial of quali-
fied immunity, but then went on to discuss lower court case law from both the 
court below and other circuits.  
 37. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 617; cf. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 244 
(2009) (reasoning, in granting qualified immunity, that defendant police offic-
ers were “entitled to rely” on decisions from other courts “even though their 
own Federal Circuit had not yet ruled” on the issue). For other cases relying 
on a split in the courts of appeals to support granting qualified immunity, see, 
e.g., Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2383 (2014); Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 
3, 5–7 (2013) (per curiam); Reichle, 132 S. Ct. at 2096–97; Safford Unified Sch. 
Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 378 (2009).  
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al of qualified immunity “absent controlling authority.”38 De-
spite al-Kidd’s addition of the qualifier “robust,” the Court as of 
2011 therefore seemed to acknowledge that Supreme Court 
precedent is not required to clearly establish a constitutional 
right. 
The retreat from al-Kidd on this front began three years 
later. In Plumhoff v. Rickard, Justice Alito’s majority opinion 
gratuitously recharacterized al-Kidd’s statement as a descrip-
tion of what a § 1983 plaintiff “at a minimum” must show.39 
Writing again for the Court last Term in City and County of 
San Francisco v. Sheehan, Justice Alito quoted al-Kidd’s “ro-
bust consensus” language, but did so in a way that suggested—
contrary to al-Kidd—that whether such a consensus suffices to 
overcome a claim of qualified immunity is an open question. 
Joined by the five other Justices who took a position on quali-
fied immunity, Justice Alito’s opinion in Sheehan branded qual-
ified immunity an “exacting standard” and then said: “[f]inally, 
to the extent that a ‘robust consensus of cases of persuasive au-
thority’ could itself clearly establish the federal right respond-
ent alleges, no such consensus exists here.”40 The Court went on 
to repeat Sheehan’s equivocal “consensus” statement in its per 
curiam ruling in Taylor v. Barkes.41 In none of these three opin-
ions did the Court offer a rationale for its caveats or even rec-
ognize that it was departing from precedent. 
As a matter of substance, the Court’s recent hints that  
§ 1983 plaintiffs may need controlling Supreme Court prece-
dent to defeat a claim of qualified immunity are troubling be-
cause the Court is much less likely to grant review in the ab-
sence of a conflict among the lower courts.42 As the majority 
pointed out in Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding, 
“[t]he unconstitutionality of outrageous conduct obviously will 
be unconstitutional, this being the reason, as Judge Posner has 
 
 38. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2084 (2011) (quoting Wilson, 526 
U.S. at 617). 
 39. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2023 (2014). 
 40. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1774, 1778 (citation omitted) (quoting al-Kidd, 
131 S. Ct. at 2084). 
 41. See Taylor, 135 S. Ct. at 2044. 
 42. See SUP. CT. R. 10 (noting that the Court grants cert “only for compel-
ling reasons” and listing conflicts in the lower courts among “the character of 
the reasons the Court considers”); see also David R. Stras, The Supreme 
Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks in the Certiorari Process, 85 TEX. 
L. REV. 947, 981–82 (2007) (book review) (reporting that almost seventy per-
cent of the Court’s merits docket during the 2003–2005 Terms was devoted to 
conflict cases). 
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said, that ‘[t]he easiest cases don’t even arise.’”43 As a matter of 
process, the Court’s retreat on this issue is subject to criticism 
as another example of its tendency to qualify and depart from 
its precedents without explanation or acknowledgement, and 
thereby to covertly extend the reach of the qualified immunity 
defense.  
III.  COMPARING QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT   
A final illustration of the Court’s pattern of silently ex-
panding the qualified immunity defense can be found in last 
Term’s brief description in Heien v. North Carolina of the rela-
tionship between qualified immunity and Fourth Amendment 
standards. Although Heien is a criminal case and not a § 1983 
suit, the Justices’ opinions describe qualified immunity in very 
generous terms reminiscent of the qualified immunity decisions 
analyzed above in Part I. 
In prior cases that have addressed the relationship be-
tween the Fourth Amendment and qualified immunity, the 
Court has long equated the qualified immunity inquiry with 
the analysis used in applying the good-faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule recognized in United States v. Leon and its 
progeny.44 Since its 1986 ruling in Malley v. Briggs, the Court 
has taken the position that “the same standard of objective rea-
sonableness that we applied in the context of a suppression 
hearing in Leon . . . defines the qualified immunity accorded an 
officer whose request for a warrant allegedly caused an uncon-
stitutional arrest.”45 Adopting different standards of reasona-
bleness in these two contexts “would be incongruous,” the 
Malley Court explained, given that the exclusionary rule im-
poses “a considerable cost to society” by suppressing relevant 
evidence, whereas a § 1983 suit “imposes a cost directly on the 
officer responsible  . . . without the side effect of hampering a 
 
 43. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 377 (2009) 
(quoting K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 1990)).  
 44. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922–23 (1984) (refusing to apply 
the exclusionary rule where police reasonably rely on a defective warrant); see 
also Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2424, 2429 (2011) (applying good-
faith exception where police reasonably rely on “binding appellate precedent” 
that is later overturned); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1995) (extend-
ing good-faith exception to police reliance on court clerk’s out-of-date computer 
records); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1987) (applying good-faith ex-
ception where police reasonably rely on an unconstitutional statute authoriz-
ing warrantless searches). 
 45. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 (1986). 
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criminal prosecution,” and is therefore more likely to aid indi-
viduals “who in fact ha[ve] done no wrong.”46 The Court has re-
iterated the analogy on several occasions, most recently in 2012 
in Messerschmidt v. Millender.47 
In Heien v. North Carolina, the Court concluded that the 
reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a stop may be based 
on a police officer’s reasonable mistake of law.48 In response to 
the concern that the Court’s holding would create an incentive 
for police to remain ignorant about the law, Chief Justice Rob-
erts’ opinion for the majority remarked that “[t]he Fourth 
Amendment tolerates only reasonable mistakes, and those mis-
takes—whether of fact or of law—must be objectively reasona-
ble.”49 On its face, this standard of objective reasonableness 
seems to resemble Harlow’s definition of qualified immunity, 
but the Chief Justice went on to add that the Fourth Amend-
ment “inquiry is not as forgiving” as the one used in “the dis-
tinct context” of qualified immunity and “[t]hus, an officer can 
gain no Fourth Amendment advantage through a sloppy study 
of the laws.”50  
Although the Court’s warning may seem in tension with 
Malley’s description of the relationship between the Fourth 
Amendment and qualified immunity, the majority opinion in 
Heien distinguished both its qualified immunity precedents and 
the good-faith exception cases on the ground that in those con-
texts the Court “had already found or assumed a Fourth 
Amendment violation” and was “considering the appropriate 
remedy.”51 By contrast, Heien involved “the antecedent ques-
tion” whether “there was a violation of the Fourth Amendment 
 
 46. Id. But cf. Krull, 480 U.S. at 368 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (question-
ing the comparison between the good-faith exception and qualified immunity 
because “suppression of illegally obtained evidence does not implicate [Har-
low’s] concern” that “individual government officers ought not be subjected to 
damages suits for arguable constitutional violations”); Orin S. Kerr, Good 
Faith, New Law, and the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 99 GEO. L.J. 1077, 
1110 (2011) (arguing that the two contexts are “conceptually different” be-
cause qualified immunity focuses on the reasonableness of “one institutional 
player” whereas the good-faith exception focuses on the police “considered as a 
collective entity”). 
 47. See Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1245 n.1 (2012); 
Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 565 n.8 (2004); id. at 566 (Kennedy, J., dissent-
ing). 
 48. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 540 (2014).  
 49. Id. at 539. 
 50. Id. at 539–40. 
 51. Id. at 539. 
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in the first place.”52 Even accepting the Court’s distinction be-
tween constitutional rights and remedies, the substantive 
Fourth Amendment question at issue in Heien—whether a po-
lice officer had the requisite reasonable suspicion to stop 
Heien’s car—did not turn on the officer’s understanding of 
Fourth Amendment principles. Rather, the mistake of law 
there involved a matter of state criminal law: whether North 
Carolina required vehicles to have two functioning brake lights. 
In fact, all nine Justices seemed to agree in Heien that a mis-
take about Fourth Amendment doctrine would have been irrel-
evant in that case “no matter how reasonable.”53 But if the gov-
ernment actor’s understanding of federal constitutional 
principles, which forms the core of the inquiry in cases involv-
ing qualified immunity and the good-faith exception, was in-
consequential in Heien, it is not apparent that the Heien dic-
tum has much to say about the scope of the qualified immunity 
defense.  
In any event, the Heien majority offered no justification for 
its suggestion that different standards of objective reasonable-
ness govern the Fourth Amendment and qualified immunity, 
and did not explain in what ways qualified immunity is more 
“forgiving.” But Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Ginsburg, 
wrote a concurring opinion that expanded on this point. Quot-
ing Malley’s reference to plain incompetence and knowing vio-
lations, the two concurring Justices agreed with the majority 
that the Fourth Amendment’s definition of a reasonable mis-
take is “more demanding” than the qualified immunity inquiry 
and then went on to elaborate that the former requires a law 
that is “genuinely ambiguous,” “‘so doubtful in construction’ 
that a reasonable judge could agree with the officer’s view.”54 In 
 
 52. Id. The Court was presumably referring here to the part of the quali-
fied immunity inquiry that evaluates whether the constitutional right was 
clearly established and not the question whether the plaintiff suffered any 
constitutional injury. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 236 (2009) 
(recognizing that the qualified immunity standard encompasses both prongs, 
but declining to mandate which step courts analyze first).  
 53. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 539 (“An officer’s mistaken view that the conduct 
at issue did not give rise to [a Fourth Amendment] violation—no matter how 
reasonable—could not change that ultimate conclusion.”); see also id. at 541 
n.1 (Kagan, J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority that “an error about 
the contours of the Fourth Amendment itself . . . can never support a search or 
seizure”); id. at 546 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (likewise noting the Court’s 
“prior assumption” that police have no “leeway” when making mistakes about 
the Fourth Amendment).  
 54. Id. at 541 (Kagan, J., concurring) (quoting The Friendship, 9 F. Cas. 
825, 826 (No. 5,125) (C.C. Mass. 1812)).  
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support of this assertion, Justice Kagan cited the Solicitor Gen-
eral’s observation at oral argument that the two standards “‘re-
quire essentially the opposite’ showings” as well as “a similar 
point” made in the State of North Carolina’s brief.55 
Starting with the brief filed on behalf of the State, the pag-
es pinpointed by Justice Kagan observed that “what is objec-
tively reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes is not the 
same as what is objectively reasonable for qualified immunity 
purposes.”56 In support, the State cited the Court’s qualified 
immunity precedents in excessive force cases, which have re-
jected the argument that qualified immunity and the merits of 
a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim are “‘merely dupli-
cative’ . . . because both issues ‘concern the objective reasona-
bleness of the officer’s conduct.’”57 Rather, the Court held in 
Saucier v. Katz, law enforcement officials are entitled to quali-
fied immunity if they make a reasonable mistake “as to wheth-
er a particular amount of force is legal” in the circumstances 
confronting them,58 explaining further in Brosseau v. Haugen 
that the law governing the permissible use of force is “one in 
which the result depends very much on the facts of each case.”59 
The Court made a similar point in discussing the Fourth 
Amendment concept of probable cause in Anderson v. 
Creighton, concluding that qualified immunity protects police 
officers who “reasonably but mistakenly” believe they have the 
probable cause needed to search or arrest.60 Although the rea-
soning in these cases can be criticized for “[d]ouble counting ‘ob-
jective reasonableness,’”61 if they represent the Justices’ views 
of the difference between Fourth Amendment standards and 
qualified immunity, Heien’s impact is limited to a subset of § 
1983 cases and the opinion breaks no new ground.  
Justice Kagan’s concurrence in Heien also cited, however, 
the Solicitor General’s statements at oral argument, which 
 
 55. Id. (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 51, Heien v. North Caro-
lina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014) (No. 13-604), 2014 WL 7661632). 
 56. Brief for the Respondent at 31, Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 
530 (2014) (No. 13-604), 2014 WL 3660500. 
 57. Id. at 31–32 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200, 203 (2001)). 
 58. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205. 
 59. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004) (per curiam); see also 
Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam) (noting that it can be 
“‘difficult for an officer to determine’” how the standards governing excessive 
force “‘apply to the factual situation the officer confronts’” (quoting Saucier, 
533 U.S. at 205)). 
 60. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987).  
 61. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 214 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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made a different point. In describing how qualified immunity 
and the Fourth Amendment are “opposite,” the Solicitor Gen-
eral, quoting Malley’s familiar refrain, maintained that the 
Fourth Amendment would not deem an officer’s mistake of law 
reasonable absent some “affirmative[] support[]” for the error 
“in the statute,” whereas law enforcement officials are entitled 
to qualified immunity unless “a precedent . . . forecloses” their 
actions.62 This proposition is potentially more troubling and 
may open the door to a more general expansion of the qualified 
immunity defense. If the Solicitor General was merely pointing 
out that the reasonable belief inquiry in cases like Heien focus-
es on officers’ understanding of state criminal statutes, as op-
posed to their understanding of federal constitutional case law, 
that is undeniably correct. But that unremarkable observation 
does not justify the Justices’ view that, in evaluating the rea-
sonableness of an officer’s beliefs, one standard is more “forgiv-
ing” or “demanding” than the other.  
Alternatively, then, the Solicitor General may have been 
implying that the tie goes to the police officer in qualified im-
munity cases but not in Fourth Amendment cases like Heien—
which is consistent with Justice Kagan’s observation that the 
ruling in Heien would deem police officers’ erroneous under-
standing of state law to be reasonable only in “exceedingly ra-
re” cases involving a “genuinely ambiguous” statute, whereas 
their mistakes about federal constitutional law are considered 
reasonable for qualified immunity purposes except in the pre-
sumably unusual circumstances of plain incompetence or know-
ing violations of Fourth Amendment norms.63 But it is not obvi-
ous why law enforcement officials should enjoy a presumption 
in some contexts but not others. After all, the Court has never 
decided which party in a § 1983 suit shoulders the burden of 
proof on qualified immunity,64 and in fact described the defense 
in Elder v. Holloway as raising “a question of law, not one of 
‘legal facts.’”65 And if the argument is that the Court has explic-
 
 62. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 55, at 51.  
 63. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 541 (2014) (Kagan, J., concur-
ring) (quoting Brief for the Respondent, supra note 56, at 17; Transcript of 
Oral Argument, supra note 55, at 48). 
 64. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 n.24 (1982) (expressly 
leaving this question open). 
 65. Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994). Although Elder arguably 
should have “finally put to rest” descriptions of qualified immunity in lan-
guage “implicating evidentiary and related burden of proof considerations,” 2 
SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE 
LAW OF SECTION 1983 § 8.96, at 8-614 (4th ed. 2015), lower courts continue to 
talk in terms of burden of proof, generally requiring plaintiffs to establish that 
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itly applied a balancing test in defining the qualified immunity 
defense and good-faith exception,66 some Supreme Court opin-
ions have also described substantive Fourth Amendment anal-
ysis in balancing-test terms—in fact, on the express grounds 
that “[t]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonable-
ness.”67 Accordingly, the Court has provided no justification for 
using varying standards to measure the “objective reasonable-
ness” of a police officer’s beliefs.68  
Given the Court’s distinction between Fourth Amendment 
rights and remedies, Heien may not signal a retreat from the 
precedents analogizing qualified immunity and the good-faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule. Nevertheless, the Justices’ 
amorphous suggestion that qualified immunity is a “forgiving” 
rather than “demanding” standard—and the implication that 
public officials who make “sloppy” errors may nevertheless sat-
isfy qualified immunity’s objective reasonableness inquiry—
mirror the change in the tone used to characterize the qualified 
immunity defense that is discussed in Part I. Justice 
Sotomayor, dissenting in Heien, criticized the majority’s insist-
ence on leaving “undefined” the objective reasonableness 
standard it was endorsing in that case as well as the failure to 
“elaborat[e]” on the distinction between that Fourth Amend-
ment standard and the qualified immunity inquiry, predicting 
that the difference “will prove murky in application.”69 Given 
the Court’s tendency to qualify its precedents and thereby cov-
ertly expand the qualified immunity defense, it would not be at 
all surprising to find future § 1983 decisions citing Heien in re-
ferring to qualified immunity as a “forgiving” defense and in 
dismissing a government actor’s misunderstanding of constitu-
tional doctrine as merely “sloppy” rather than “plainly incom-
 
the constitutional right in question was clearly established. See 2 RODNEY A. 
SMOLLA, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS § 14:54 (3d ed. 2010). 
 66. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906–07 (1984); Harlow, 457 
U.S. at 813–14. 
 67. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 855 n.4 (2006); see also Maryland 
v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969 (2013); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 
118–19 (2001). 
 68. Cf. John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional 
Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 89 (1999) (“Generally speaking, the kind of fault re-
quired [in constitutional tort suits] is negligence with respect to illegality.”). 
But cf. Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrow-
ing and Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 726 & n.283 (2011) (taking the 
contrary view that the Court’s qualified immunity cases “approach[] a stand-
ard sounding more in gross negligence or recklessness”). 
 69. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 547 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting). 
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petent.” 
  CONCLUSION   
In recent years, the Supreme Court opinions applying the 
qualified immunity defense have engaged in a pattern of de-
scribing the defense in increasingly generous terms and quali-
fying and deviating from past precedent—without offering any 
justification or even acknowledgement of the Court’s departure 
from prior case law. These gratuitous, seemingly off-the-cuff 
remarks have then taken on a life of their own and have been 
reiterated in later opinions, often issued summarily without the 
benefit of briefing and oral argument. The clandestine manner 
in which this retreat has been accomplished is especially trou-
bling because, despite the fact that constitutional tort suits 
against state officials are based on federal statute, qualified 
immunity is a doctrine—and a limitation on that statute—that 
is entirely the Court’s creation, devoid of support in § 1983’s 
legislative history. 
Perhaps most problematic are the caveats in recent deci-
sions that could conceivably set the stage for a ruling that  
§ 1983 plaintiffs can avoid qualified immunity only if they can 
point to Supreme Court precedent supporting the constitutional 
right they are asserting. An outright holding that only the Su-
preme Court can create clearly established law would obviously 
be binding on lower courts and would prove fatal to many con-
stitutional tort suits. But terminology and tone matter as well, 
and the increasingly broad brush the Supreme Court uses in 
characterizing the qualified immunity defense is not likely to 
escape the attention of government actors seeking immunity or 
the lower courts tasked with resolving their claims. 
